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ABSTRACT
The central premise behind risk homeostasis theory is that
humans adapt their behaviors, based on external factors, to
align with a personal risk tolerance level. In essence, this
means that the safer or more secure they feel, the more
likely it is that they will behave in a risky manner. If this
e￿ect exists, it serves to restrict the ability of risk mitigation
techniques to e￿ect improvements.
The concept is hotly debated in the safety area. Some
authors agree that the e￿ect exists, but also point out that
it is poorly understood and unreliably predicted. Other re-
searchers consider the entire concept fallacious. It is impor-
tant to gain clarity about whether the e￿ect exists, and to
gauge its impact if such evidence can indeed be found.
In this paper we consider risk homeostasis in the context
of information security. Similar to the safety area, informa-
tion security could well be impaired if a risk homeostasis
e￿ect neutralizes the potential bene￿ts of risk mitigation
measures. If the risk homeostasis e￿ect does indeed exist
and does impact risk-related behaviors, people will simply
elevate risky behaviors in response to feeling less vulnerable
due to following security procedures and using protective
technologies.
Here we discuss, in particular, the challenges we face in
con￿rming the existence and impact of the risk homeostasis
e￿ect in information security, especially in an era of ethical
research practice.
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1 INTRODUCTION
To commence our discussion we start with the basics, de￿n-
ing homeostasis. The French psychologist Bernard ￿rst intro-
duced the notion of homeostasis in 1878 [9] (cited by [20]).
He argued that people naturally maintained particular in-
ternal variables within narrow boundaries. Any change in
the external system might necessitate a change to their in-
ternal system in order to maintain the variable within the
boundaries. Redolfo [70] provides some examples of this ef-
fect. The human body maintains a steady temperature by
either sweating or shivering. The interaction of supply and
demand keeps prices stable.
Pelzman [67] was one of the ￿rst to raise the idea that peo-
ple would moderate their behaviors if safety measures made
them feel that it was safe to take more risks. He had noted
that the imposition of seat belt legislation had not resulted
in the anticipated reduction in road fatalities. He surmised
that some behavioral adaptation was taking place. Wilde
[99], along the same lines, argues for this same behavioral
adaptation, actively defending attacks on the existence and
impact of what he calls risk homeostasis theory (RHT). The
core concept is that people will take more risks when they
feel safer in doing so, and that this behavioral adaptation
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makes safety measures less powerful than they could be in
terms of reducing harm.
NIST [42] de￿nes risk as: “A measure of the extent to which
an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event,
and typically a function of: (i) the adverse impacts that would
arise if the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood
of occurrence.” There are thus three components to risk: (a) an
external threat agent, (b) the likelihood that an adverse event
will occur, and (c) the anticipated negative impact thereof.
Personal risk assessment, thus, implicitly gauges all three of
these. The risk homeostasis assertion is that the person then
moderates his or her behavior in order to align the actual
risk to his or her risk target level.
Such moderated behavior might be calculated to eliminate
or reduce vulnerabilities, likelihood or impact. Behaviors
are informed by perceptions, and, as Slovic [80] points out:
“Risk does not exist ‘out there’, independent of our minds and
cultures, waiting to be ‘measured’. Human beings have invented
the concept risk to help them understand and cope with the
dangers and uncertainties of life”
Behavior thus depends on individual and societal percep-
tion of risk [40]. Risk perception is in￿uenced by a number
of di￿erent aspects of the risk, including voluntariness [39],
controllability [77], immediacy of e￿ect [78], whether it is
manmade or natural [14], familiarity [82], habituation [49],
potential bene￿ts of risky behaviour [82] and the ease with
which the risk impact is brought to mind [16]. Slovic [79]
collapses the factors that impact risk perception into three
categories: (1) dread [control, potential for catastrophe, ben-
e￿ts, consequences], (2) whether it is known or unknown
[observability, knowledge of risks, immediacy and novelty],
and (3) whether individuals, society or future generations are
a￿ected. These three factors will interact in unpredictable
ways that make it di￿cult to predict how an individual will
perceive a particular risk at any particular point in time.
Wilde [99] considers risk-taking to be an inherent part
of the human psyche. He argues that people have a deep
seated need to take risks and that this need is individually
determined. He argues that we all have a “target level of
risk.” He suggests the concept of a personal “risk thermo-
stat,” indicating how much risk each person is prepared to
tolerate. This implies that people assess risk and then act in
a way that aligns with their risk tolerance. If anything in
the environment changes, it is argued that they will compen-
sate by moderating the riskiness of their actions to bring the
risk back to within the boundaries of their own risk comfort
zone. In other words, in the presence of new risk-reduction
methods or technologies, RHT suggests that individuals will
compensate by engaging in greater levels of risky behaviors.
For example, consider the person who wears a seat belt
— he or she is taking action to reduce the negative conse-
quences of an accident. If, as RHT suggests, this reduces the
risk level to something below his or her target level, he or
she might drive faster, thereby increasing the likelihood of
an accident occurring. By so doing, he or she re-establishes
the risk level to what it would have been without the seat
belt.
There is a large body of literature related to risk home-
ostasis. It comes across as a polarizing issue, characterized
by heated rebuttals and counter rebuttals. This is in no small
part due to the di￿culties related to con￿rming the existence
of the e￿ect, and the challenges of designing experiments
that will be considered sound by everyone in the ￿eld.
We hope to contribute to the ￿eld by considering how we
could go about con￿rming the existence and impact of this
e￿ect in the ￿eld of Information Security. The idea that
such an e￿ect might play a role has been posited by [41],
[93] and [65]. It is important to explore the existence and
impact of this e￿ect in information security. If we do indeed
con￿rm a risk homeostasis e￿ect, we can propose ways of
ameliorating it to ensure that our e￿orts to bolster cyber
security are not neutralized by even more risky behaviors.
2 RISK HOMEOSTASIS
That people change their behavior in response to changes
in external circumstances, when it comes to risky behaviors,
has been argued by Hedlund [34], who says “We all change
our behavior in response to changes in our environment. . . . .
Never assume that behavior will not change” (p88).
Yet exactly how people change their behaviors is not al-
ways predictable. Historically, scholars assumed that deci-
sions, including personal decisions about engaging in risky
behaviors, were grounded in a rational assessment of fun-
damental decision criteria, including the relative costs and
bene￿ts of risky behaviors. Simon [76] suggested that human
decision making was characterized by bounded rationality,
which re￿ects imperfect information, imperfect decision-
making abilities, and rapid choices made without full con-
sideration of all costs and bene￿ts [28]. This foundation has
informed our understanding of decisions in the context of
computer security hygiene, wherein researchers have as-
sumed that individual computer users will adopt an essen-
tially rational approach to determining the degree to which
they will engage in inconvenient or onerous security be-
haviors (e.g. changing passwords, encrypting data, patching
software) and avoid such behaviors when the costs are too
high. This core boundary condition is also consistent with
Fishbein and Ajzen’s Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) [29].
Whether individuals observe a rational decision-making pro-
cess when determining the level of risk they will tolerate is
an open question that demands further exploration.
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Damasio and Damasio [20] point out that in living systems
homeostasis controls can be either conscious and deliber-
ate, or subconscious and automatic. Redolfo [70] considers
homeostatic reactions to be both inevitable and automatic.
Even if the homeostasis e￿ort is conscious, people might
not be willing to admit to it [30], especially if taking such
risks is socially unacceptable [64].
If it is automatically driven, as argued by the researchers,
this makes the e￿ect particularly hard to verify and prove.
People might not even be aware enough of their behavioral
motivations to be able to verbalize their reasons for changing
the way they respond to risk mitigation measures. Like other
latent constructs (e.g. attitudes and beliefs), there can be no
direct (objective) measurement thereof.
Due to these di￿culties, observations and measures of
behavior change which re￿ect the latent construct are used
as approximations. These side e￿ects are studied, rather than
the e￿ect itself, because studying actual brain activity (e.g.,
with fMRI) is very challenging and not yet an exact science
[94]. The use of these re￿ective (second-hand) measures
implies that we cannot realistically identify the exact mecha-
nisms that led to any changes that we observe. We cannot be
con￿dent that any change has occurred because of the brain’s
need for homeostasis. It might equally be a consequence of
some other poorly-understood behavioral adaptation.
Some examples serve to illustrate the di￿culties in con-
￿rming that RHT holds. Consider trapeze artists. They unde-
niably attempt far riskier maneuvers when safety nets are in
place than when they are not. In other contexts adaptation
of behavior in the presence of safety measures has also been
observed. Klen [43] found that when Finnish loggers wore
more protection they also behaved more carelessly. Both of
these studies have been used to argue for the existence of
risk homeostasis. However, as explained above, a mere be-
havioral change does not point infallibly to risk homeostasis;
it might be caused by other factors that we have not yet
identi￿ed or those that have not yet been linked to risky
behaviors.
The question of whether motorcycle helmets are e￿ective
demonstrates the debate very well [1]. Adams [2] presents
arguments both for and against compulsory wearing of hel-
mets. He argues that risk compensation is simply common
sense, and o￿ers the data to support his argument, all the
while acknowledging that others have analyzed the same
data di￿erently to arrive at the opposite conclusion. He uses
cycling fatalities and the impact of helmet wearing legisla-
tion to make his argument. Between 1966 and 1969 a number
of US states enacted laws to require bikers to wear helmets.
After 1977 about half of the states repealed the law. The
strange thing is that the number of fatalities increased by
a greater percentage in states that had not repealed the law
than in those that had. People wearing helmets might have
behaved more recklessly, so that fatality rates did not de-
crease. The wearing of helmets, Adams argues, initiated a
perverse response from bikers, and did not reduce harm.
Studies in other areas have delivered unconvincing results
[1, 2]. Many risk homeostasis studies have been carried out
in the tra￿c context, and consideration of the impact of seat
belts has received a great deal of attention. The problem is
that people report mixed results. For example, Evans [27]
found that people wearing seat belts tended to follow other
cars more closely than those without seat belts. Lund and
Zador [52] and O’Neill et al. [62] examined the same issue
and failed to discover an increase in risky behaviors.
These kinds of inconsistencies have led some researchers
to deny the very existence of the risk homeostasis e￿ect
[26, 52, 55]. They argue that other behavioral pathways, or
combinations of these pathways, lead to the observable be-
haviors that others attribute to a single risk homeostasis
e￿ect.
A number of researchers reject the RHT, and the idea
that humans have a personal target level of risk tolerance
[26, 52, 55, 63]. O’Neill and Williams consider it on a par
with the ￿at earth hypothesis [63].
3 RISK HOMEOSTASIS & RISK
MITIGATION
In many avenues of society legislative measures have been
enacted to protect people and minimize harm. Authorities
argue that safety features are desirable because at least “some-
thing is being done” to reduce injuries and fatalities. If, as
Wilde argues, each person has an individual risk appetite,
interventions might easily be less e￿ective than intended
and anticipated.
Hagel and Meeuwisse [31] bemoan the fact that mandated
protection might, perversely, give people a false sense of
security and lead to other kinds of risky behaviors which
will result in di￿erent kinds of injuries, but not reduce fatali-
ties. Their argument is that, in attempting to make people
safer, such measures could actually be muddying the wa-
ters. Other, more e￿ective, measures, might well be available,
but the deployment of “something must be done” measures,
and the inertia their engagement generates, might curtail
investigations into more e￿ective measures.
The idea that risk homeostasis could negate the potential
positive e￿ects of precautionary measures is clearly some-
thing those in authority are considering when risk mitigation
measures are advanced. For example, Zimet et al. [104] re-
ports concerns about promiscuous behavior of teenagers
being prompted by a feeling of invincibility (RHT e￿ect) due
to having received the HPV vaccination. This argument was
rejected and many authorities now o￿er the vaccine to 11
and 12 year old girls. This anecdote emphasizes the need
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for more clarity in this area. The argument could well have
gone the other way, leaving many teenagers vulnerable to
cervical cancer, based on people believing in the impact of
an e￿ect whose existence is still being questioned.
4 EXPERIMENTINGWITH RISK
HOMEOSTASIS
Wilde et al. [100] admit that there is a lack of controlled ex-
perimental veri￿cation for the risk homeostasis e￿ect. They
blame two factors for this: (1) the shortcomings of the lab
for testing the e￿ect, and (2) complications inherent in the
theory itself. We are adding another category to these two:
(3) confounding factors.
4.1 (1) Limitations of Lab Studies
Con￿rming the existence and impact of risk homeostasis
requires us to manipulate the risk levels, and then to monitor
participants’ behavior. However, ethical guidelines require
us to ensure that participants are not placed at risk during
any research we conduct. Hoyes and Glendon [36] argue
that the absence of real harm in risk homeostasis studies
might mean that such investigations uncover optimization
strategies instead of risk homeostasis e￿ects.
Other approximations have been proposed. Hoyes and
Glendon [36] suggest that a way around this is to use a sim-
ulation engine; ensuring thereby that the participant him
or herself is not at risk, nor their belongings. Some have
expressed reservations about this technique since risky be-
haviors in simulation environments will have only virtual
consequences, and might not be a realistic approximation
of real-life behaviors [35]. Nor can anyone be sure that they
are measuring a personal risk tolerance range and conse-
quent behavioral adjustment. Since most of these games
have a competitive element any observable change might
be a consequence of natural competitiveness and behavioral
optimizations used to win the game. Indeed [90] discovered
in their experiments into the existence of risk homeostasis
that achievement situations would confound such studies.
Wilde himself [99] considered simulation studies a sham and
a contradiction in terms.
Hoyes and Stanton [38] argue that monetary gain/loss
could be used to induce risk (since it is as “real” to partici-
pants as other risks). So, an experimenter could conceivably
give participants an endowment and then let them partici-
pate in some kind of game where they gain or lose money
based on their behavior. The amount of money they’re given
would have to be substantial enough to make it realistic. The
researchers’ ￿nancial commitment is likely to be prohibi-
tive enough to make this infeasible for academic scholars.
Moreover, other confounding factors could be the student’s
personal ￿nancial status, their family background, and ability
to handle money.
Laboratory experimental designs frequently use students
as experimental subjects, who may, or may not, constitute
an e￿ective sampling frame. Students might be woefully in-
adequate for testing risk homeostasis. In the ￿rst place, [11]
report that the use of precautionary measures increases with
age, which might demonstrate a lower risk tolerance as peo-
ple age. On the other hand, the older population is also less
comfortable with technology and may, due to uncertainty,
take fewer risks anyway. If we test for RHT e￿ects with a
young, less risk-averse population, our ￿ndings are unlikely
to be generalizable to other population groups.
4.2 (2) RHT: The Theory
RHT is based on the concept of utility, and relies on the
fact that people can assess ongoing risk accurately and re-
alistically. Wilde [99] suggests that a road user intuitively
compares actual and target risk, and moderates his/her be-
havior to align actual and target risk as closely as possible.
Wilde [101] argues that a realistic assessment of risk is a
requirement for risk homeostasis to mediate behavior.
There are some problems with this theory. The ￿rst is
related to human ability and propensity to judge risk. The
second is related to the completeness of the theory.
4.2.1 Judging Risk. RHT relies on people having an accu-
rate conception of risk [56], and this basic requirement was
con￿rmed by [68]. Yet we know that risk perception is of-
ten inaccurate and socially informed instead of realistic [36].
There is also the fact that humans resist seeing themselves
statistically when it comes to risk [59]. Moreover, people
are unrealistic in judging their own performance abilities
[50, 60]. Risk, in a particular situation, is partly determined
by performance, so this, too, makes risk assessment inaccu-
rate.
The accurate risk assessment requirement might well
make it impossible to test for risk homeostasis in many areas
where people have less experience of judging risk. Infor-
mation Security is a good example. Unlike tra￿c, which
just about everyone has personal experience of, information
technology is a relatively recent development and one that
many people understand only poorly. The risks have not
been quanti￿ed or understood, nor, perhaps, is it possible to
do so, rendering any accurate calculation of the actual risk
infeasible.
The other problem with the risk homeostasis idea is that
a sober assessment of utility, and acting upon it, assumes ra-
tionality, something that is questioned by researchers in this
area [21, 98]. There are many examples where people do not
maximize utility, often for emotional reasons. For example,
consider restaurant tipping behavior. People tip after they
Risk Homeostasis NSPW’17, October 2017, Santa Cruz, CA, USA
have received a service, and if they do not plan to frequent
that restaurant again there is no good reason to tip. Yet, even
in these circumstances, people do tip: for no personal gain.
This does not align with pure utility maximization.
It might be possible to approximate a situation where the
actual risk is clear and obvious to a participant in an experi-
ment. However, it would not be possible to guarantee that
the ￿ndings of such an experiment would be generalizable
to the real world of multiply-faceted risk decisions. Indeed,
Runcie and Seaver [71], in their exploration of risk home-
ostasis, mention this unknowable nature of the risk as a real
issue in the ￿eld of risk homeostasis studies.
4.2.2 Theory Incompleteness. O’Neill and Williams [63]
explain that though people might change their behavior in
response to changing levels of risk, this does not necessarily
point to the applicability of a universal RHT. More research is
required in order to understand the conditions under which
this happens.
McKenna [56] o￿ers a tra￿c-related explanation, arguing
that measures that do not a￿ect the individual’s interaction
with the environment (padded dashboards, shatter resistant
windshields) will not initiate behavior change. Stre￿ and
Geller [86] tested driving with, and without, seat belts. In-
terestingly, they discovered that participants who used a
seat belt, after having driven without one, drove faster while
wearing the belt. A similar between-subjects experiment did
not uncover any di￿erences, suggesting that the experience
of a direct change made the di￿erence. The fact that they per-
ceived a di￿erence made their original, perhaps faulty, risk
perceptions less important. The di￿erence was detectable,
and this led to the behavioral change, not actual and accurate
risk assessment.
Risk homeostasis, if it does exist, can be achieved by [37]:
(1) behavioral change within the environment; (2) mode mi-
gration; or (3) avoidance.Wilde’s theory focuses primarily on
the ￿rst of these, without giving much credence to the other
two. So, for example, if you implement some safety tra￿c
intervention, and you notice that tra￿c accidents have not
decreased, you could consider this evidence of the risk home-
ostasis e￿ect. It could also be that people have switched to
public transportation and that the intervention has actually
made driving less safe. This brings us back to the discussion
right at the beginning — we’re measuring side-e￿ects, and it
is impossible to measure all the factors that could lead to a
change.
Haight [32] concludes that this theory is “incoherent.”
Evans [26] is also critical of the theory, saying that the ev-
idence points clearly away from a risk homeostasis e￿ect
rather than towards it.
4.3 (3) Confounding Factors
4.3.1 Real-life Risky Behavior is Socially Informed. People
might become aware of the fact that people mistrust a partic-
ular practice and adapt their own behavior as a consequence
[36]. There is some evidence of this when it comes to tra￿c
[6] and it might, or might not, apply equally to information
security. Very few lab studies attempt to incorporate this,
probably because it is particularly challenging to do so.
4.3.2 Feedback is Essential. Purely on a personal level,
real life allows people to experience natural feedback. This,
too, is hard to replicate e￿ectively in a lab environment [99]
where we attempt to control all possible confounding factors
so that realistic feedback is often not provided, or provided
inadequately. This might be due to ethical concerns related
to scaring people when they behave too riskily.
4.3.3 Short Term E￿ects may not Endure. The short term
nature of lab-based experiments is another confounding fac-
tor. Risky behavior evolves over time [36]. This brings into
question the validity, and limits the generalizability of, the
￿ndings of short-term lab studies. Longitudinal research de-
signs might capture the temporal e￿ects, but they impose
more challenges to ethics board approval and to valid imple-
mentations.
4.3.4 Uncertainty. Real risky behaviors have two impon-
derables (a) uncertainty of performance, and (b) uncertainty
of consequence. So, for example, if someone drives he/she
cannot be absolutely sure that they will always avoid having
an accident. People might be distracted or drive into a slip-
pery patch, making actual performance unpredictable. Also,
if people do have an accident, they cannot know whether
they will walk away unharmed or be seriously injured. Both
uncertainties add yet another confounding factor to risk
homeostasis studies.
There are two personal dimensions in￿uencing perfor-
mance: (a) high-level decision processes, and (b) low-level
control performances. Summala [87] points out that when
the two are combined the e￿ect looks like risk homeostasis
but, in fact, is merely an aggregation of di￿erences in either
or both of these aspects, Performance is in￿uenced by driv-
ing conditions (the environment) but also by the individual’s
personal state of mind and body, whether or not he/she is
fully aware of this fact.
4.3.5 Ethics. The Belmont report [22] presents three prin-
ciples to which ethical research studies must adhere. (1) Re-
spect for Persons, (2) Bene￿cence, and (3) Justice. These
principles have been put into place to protect participants
from the kinds of notorious experiments reported in the
literature that did indeed harm participants [58, 103]. We
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wholeheartedly endorse these principles, and it is instructive
to consider how they impact risk homeostasis studies.
The ￿rst principle requires respect for autonomy. In a risk
homeostasis study, we want to measure an e￿ect that is
probably subconscious. Making people consciously aware
of the risks might well make it impossible to attribute any
e￿ect to risk homeostasis because such awareness might
confound the study and interfere with activation of the risk
homeostasis e￿ect.
The second principle requires people to be protected from
harm. Risk behaviors, by their very nature, have harm as
their probable consequence.
The ￿nal principle, justice, requires burdens not to be un-
duly imposed. It could well be argued that allowing people
to experience the consequences of risky behaviors, merely
to con￿rm the existence of a risk homeostasis e￿ect, might
not meet this principle.
5 RISK TOLERANCE LEVEL STABILITY
The risk homeostasis e￿ect relies on a core assumption of a
personal, relatively stable, risk target level. It does not seem
to have any way to incorporate the impact of other powerful
factors that in￿uence and change this level over time.
5.1 Habituation E￿ect
People’s attitudes to risk change as they become more ac-
customed to engaging in a risky behavior: they habituate to
the risk [19], especially if they feel they have the skills to
manage it. People are less likely to comply with warnings
about the danger of particular risky activities as they become
more familiar with carrying out the activity [13, 92].
MacCurdy [53] provides some examples of this. For exam-
ple, lion tamers know better than anyone else how danger-
ous it is to be close to lions yet they are happy to operate
in such an environment, because they are con￿dent in their
ability to manage the risk. MacCurdy also points out that
bomb disposal experts should actually be paralyzed by fear,
given the potential consequences of a mistake. They are not,
though, because they have the skills to cope with the risk
(controllability [23]), and are accustomed to taking the risk
(habituation).
These examples suggest that a stable risk appetite is not
guaranteed. It could be argued that the people mentioned
in the previous paragraph are unusual, and the usual risk
homeostasis e￿ect does not operate for them. In reality, we
all behave in this way, albeit less sensationally. Every au-
tomobile driver essentially operates a moving vehicle that
weighs tons, and the driver is at signi￿cant risk of being
involved in a car accident whenever a number of cars share
the road. It is rare to encounter someone who does not drive
because of this particular risk; most drivers simply become
used to it (habituation). They become more comfortable with
the risk, suggesting a strong experiential in￿uence on risk ap-
petite. This is maintained until they have an accident, which
activates the experience e￿ect, discussed next.
5.2 Experience E￿ect
It seems logical that direct experience of risk would in￿uence
risk perception. Weinstein [97] carried out a study to explore
this and reported that experience did not make a lasting and
sustained impact on self-protective behavior. Norris et al.
[61] revisited his hypotheses and reported that experience
did indeed have lasting and substantial e￿ects on behaviors.
There is some evidence from other researchers for this [15,
25, 33, 57]. Moreover, other people’s experiences, if vivid
and perceived to be relevant personally, also impact people’s
future risk perceptions [85].
People who have experienced an event often respond by
acting to prevent a re-occurrence. This means that the ex-
perience leads to more con￿dence, not less. This happens,
Norris et al. [61] argue, because they go through the cogni-
tive actions required to establish control over the situation.
This depends on two aspects (1) response e￿cacy, and (2)
their own self-e￿cacy [4, 69, 97].
5.3 Disposition, Predilection & Emotion
People are uniquely di￿erent from one another. One partic-
ular di￿erence that impacts behavior in risky situations is
optimism bias [95].
For example, Aspinwall and Brunbart [7] found that dis-
positional optimism impacted the processing of health risk
information. On the other hand, Pedruzzi and Swinbourn
[66] did not ￿nd a similar impact on processing of road risk
information. They posit that this is due to the fact that people
feel more in control of their road risks, where health risks
might seem somewhat arbitrary. There is evidence that con-
trollability of a risk leads people to downplay the likelihood
and severity of risks [23], so their argument makes sense.
Tekeli-Yeşil et al. [89] found that gender and socio-economic
factors also impacted risk perception. Although this could be
used to argue for a personal risk target, as Pelzman andWilde
do, there is also evidence that personality is not necessarily
stable over our lifetimes [10].
Adam Smith famously wrote that passions combine with
reason to lead to the decisions that people take [83]. More
recently a number of researchers have written about the role
of emotions in decision making [8, 51, 81]. Decision making
is impacted by both current (emotional state at the time of
the decision) and anticipated emotions (based on expected
outcomes) [74]. These contribute to the unpredictability of
human behavior.
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5.4 Summary
The in￿uence of these idiosyncratic factors appears to negate
the notion of a stable risk target level. What is indicated by
the literature is a level that ￿uctuates as we go through life,
in￿uenced by our malleable and changeable perceptions,
our personal experiences, the experiences of those close to
us and those we read about in the media. It might be that
what is identi￿ed as a risk homeostasis e￿ect is, in fact, the
impact of an increased perception of the controllability of
a risk. The literature on the impact of controllability on
risk behaviors is well established, and this impact widely
accepted, unlike the risk homeostasis e￿ect. Hence a small
matter of the imposition of a risk mitigation strategy, such
as a seat belt, might well be drowned out by the stronger
in￿uences of other factors.
6 THE INFORMATION SECURITY
CONTEXT
The security of any organization, personal computer, or mo-
bile device depends on the behavior of those who use them.
A number of technical measures are implemented on systems
in order to repel hacking attacks. Other technical measures
ensure the availability of data by performing automatic back-
ups of information.
If we consider the parallels between the information se-
curity and safety ￿elds we have to wonder whether these
measures make people adjust their behavior so that they take
more risks, simply because existing measures are deemed to
protect them from harm.
This kind of trade-o￿ was reported by Ruotti et al. [72].
Their study’s participants were more willing to use their
credit cards online because they knew that banks would
refund charges if they were fraudulent. This example demon-
strates that risk homeostasis, if it does indeed exist, can lead
to positive outcomes by encouraging people to take actions
online that they would otherwise be too risk-averse to at-
tempt.
On the other hand, if people are mistaken in their percep-
tion of the actual risks, this could lead to real harm.Wash and
Rader [96] investigated beliefs about information security
and the actions that people take and found that many people
were informed or wrongly informed about security and the
e￿cacy of the actions they currently take. They conclude
that there is a need to acknowledge a wide range of beliefs
which directly inform risky or protective behaviors.
One particular confounding factor, in terms of testing for
risk homeostasis in information security, is that there is pos-
sibly amoral dimension in this ￿eld. Information security
professionals talk about “poor” security behaviors [45] and
“bad” or “good” passwords [88]. These are judgmental terms.
Hoyes and Glendon [36] explain that studies of changed
behaviors linked to risk homeostasis are only valid when
there is no right or wrong course of action. If there is a “good”
and “bad” course of action then risk homeostasis is not being
tested, but rather something else. In this case we might be
observing the results of a social desirability adaptation rather
than a personal risk homeostasis e￿ect.
Finally, as pointed out in the previous section, people can
actually be more comfortable with risk if they have experi-
enced a bad event and have determined how to control it. Yet
hacking attacks are so frequent and unpredictable, and 100%
security so unattainable, that this kind of controllability is
probably infeasible. Indeed, Creese et al. [17] investigated
whether experience of a breach led to a change in risk per-
ception, and did not detect any behavioral change.
Moreover, Norris et al. [61] point out that behavior changes
more reliably when proactive and vigilant behaviors are
needed than when the person needs to adopt disciplined
behaviors, perhaps requiring self denial. These two behavior
types are di￿erent in a profound way, so we can expect the
behavioral change mechanisms to be di￿erent too. Hazard
defence is changed by experience, but a switch to more dis-
ciplined behaviors is far more complex. It might be naïve to
consider that mere exposure to a negative experience will
lead to more disciplined behaviors.
7 RHT & INFORMATION SECURITY
Research designs strive to maximize three criteria when
collecting evidence: generalizability, precision, and realism.
Each research design favors one or another of these goals
and therefore exhibits known ￿aws [54].
Survey research is high in generalizability, lab experiments
are high in precision, and ￿eld experiments (and case studies)
are high in realism. Researchers utilizing laboratory experi-
ments to study individual security behaviors may rigorously
examine individual subjects in a controlled environment
where many research variables can be carefully controlled,
but in this case realism su￿ers because this arti￿cial setting
only mimics reality. Generalizability also su￿ers because
speci￿c conditions and research subjects were used, and the
results may not apply to di￿erent conditions and/or people.
Field experiments are considered highly realistic as they
examine natural environments, but are challenging (or im-
possible) in the context of risk homeostasis, and so precision
and generalizability will su￿er.
Survey research has high generalizability, especially when
survey instruments are distributed across multiple organi-
zations in multiple industries, and are commonly used in
security behavior research [18]. However, surveys lack real-
ism and precision. To investigate risk homeostasis, we cannot
simulate the perception of risk — we must observe subjects
NSPW’17, October 2017, Santa Cruz, CA, USA Renaud & Warkentin
who feel actual risk in a realistic setting. There are many
challenges in achieving this.
Having ruled out a lab study, based on the weaknesses
pointed out earlier, we now consider the use of naturalistic
experiments.
Hedlund [34] says that if the risk compensation e￿ect
is to be avoided, the measure needs to score low on four
factors.We consider these as theymight apply in information
security:
Hedlund Number 1.
The safetymeasure has to be detectable anddiscernible.
Anti-virus and other technical security measures mostly do
their jobs invisibly so are arguably not visible enough to be
detectable;
Hedlund Number 2.
The safety measure has to a￿ect the individual. Many
organizations implement technical measures to protect de-
vices from SPAM. If these measures never prevent one of
their personal emails from being delivered, the person would
not be aware of how the software is protecting them. In
this case, the risk homeostasis e￿ect cannot come into play.
The threat and the protection must be personally relevant
to the individual person. This is illustrated by the ￿ndings
of a study carried out by Egelman and Schechter [24] who
found that people disregarded warnings during the experi-
ment (while using the researcher’s laptop). They said they
did not care because their own devices would not be harmed,
only the researcher’s computer.
Hedlund Number 3.
There must be a reason for users to change their be-
havior. This suggests that when they feel less at risk they
are motivated to behave more riskily. Information security
behaviors might well satisfy this requirement since it has
been shown that if people become more aware of risk they
adapt their behavior accordingly [47, 48]. However, this adap-
tation happens at a conscious level and might not satisfy the
automaticity required by the risk homeostasis e￿ect.
Hedlund Number 4.
They must have discretionary control. Behavior must
not be tightly controlled or ￿rmly mandated with monitor-
ing and sanctions for non-compliance. If an employer im-
plements an Information Security Policy (with prescribed
policies and procedures), then any change in behavior could
simply be due to employees’ desire to comply with the rules
or to avoid sanctions, or due to recent Security Training and
Awareness programs or campaigns, rather than being a risk
homeostasis behavioral adjustment.
7.1 Observational Studies
Spring et al. [84] points out that observations are an essen-
tial ￿rst step before actual risk-related experiments can be
carried out.
Given the ethical constraints, as enumerated in Section
4.3.5, how could an experiment be designed to test the risk
homeostasis e￿ect? The main issue is that experimental par-
ticipants should not be harmed. Could we perhaps make
people believe that actual risk is higher than it really is, and
see whether they then reduce the riskiness of their behav-
iors?
Given the objections to lab experiments detailed in Section
4.1, we would have to deploy an instrumented application
that would (1) facilitate a range of actions of varying levels
of riskiness, and (2) log all user actions. Such an app would
signal di￿erent levels of risk to alter risk perceptions. We
could then determine how people react in response to signals
about the level of risk, in terms of engaging in risky behaviors.
Lévesque et al. [44] carried out a longitudinal experiment
that simply monitored people’s laptops for infections and
also monitors behaviors. The authors report that the experi-
ment produced insights that would not have been possible
without this observational experiment. Akawe and Felt [5]
carried out an observational investigation into how web
surfers respond to browser warnings. They wanted to under-
stand howwell people respond to di￿erent kinds of warnings.
Bravo-Lillo et al. [12] carried out a between-subjects study
to test the e￿cacy of di￿erent warning designs in order to
￿nd the best design in terms of drawing user attention to
important information.
7.2 No Experimental Manipulation
One way of testing for risk homeostasis is to collect real
world data either before and after an intervention or to com-
pare two equivalent areas where one has had an intervention
applied and the other not. This is carried out in other risk
contexts where it would be unethical to manipulate real risk
as part of an experiment. So, for example, Adams [2] collected
information about cycling fatalities in US states with and
without helmet legislation in order to see whether helmets
led to fewer fatalities.
It might be possible to collect information about infor-
mation security incidents (as an measure of the outcome of
risky behaviors) in organizations with di￿erent implemented
risk-reduction measures. For example, some organizations
permit their employees and contractors to use their own de-
vices without hindrance, whereas others implement a BYOD
policy that mandates that the organizations install technical
packages on the device if it is to be used on the organization’s
network [46]. The di￿culty would lie in ￿nding comparable
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organizations. They would have to have the same, or roughly
equivalent, information security policies. They would have
to exercise the same kind of control over their employees
(Hedlund number 4). The employees ought to be made aware
of the e￿cacy of the particular measure (Hedlund number
1).
Some organizations have switched to Google as a mail
server instead of maintaining their own mail servers (Hed-
lund number 2). Google has superior Phish detection capabil-
ities. We could try to ￿nd two equivalent organizations, one
using their own servers and another using Google. Employ-
ees should be told about Google’s superiority in detecting
Phish messages (Hedlund number 1), and trained to be aware
of Phishing (Hedlund number 3). We could count the number
of successful phish attacks in each organization for a ￿xed
period of time. This might demonstrate that people are more
willing to click on an emailed link if it came in via Google
(considering it less risky).
The issue, naturally, will lie in ￿nding comparable organi-
zations. It is impossible to control for, or even uncover, all
confounding di￿erences between organizations which could
be responsible for any observed change [91].
7.3 Quasi-Experimental Approach
Another option is deliberately to assess a situation by taking
a number of measurements both before and after a particular
intervention: a quasi-realistic study. This allows for a more
￿ne-grained measurement of impact than statistics reported
by organizations which could be incomplete or incorrect.
While this might seem a reasonable way to test for risk
homeostasis, testing in this kind of quasi-experimental study
has the following issues, as discussed before:
(1) RHT does not predict the behavioral pathway through
which an e￿ect manifests itself. It is hard to separate
cause from e￿ect to judge conclusively that it was risk
homeostasis that led to a particular outcome.
(2) The e￿ect might be short-term, with re-establishment
of previous behavior in the long term.
(3) The participants could be over-compensating because
they are aware of the experimental conditions (re-
quired by ethical guidelines).
(4) It only addresses the consequences of a change in in-
trinsic risk perception. It does not help us to decide
whether individuals are characterized by an individual
target level of risk, or whether any such target can be
shifted via changes in utilities.
The di￿culties are demonstrated by a study carried out by
[73] into whether drivers with antilock brakes and airbags
took more risks than those without. They reported di￿er-
ences in driving but also acknowledged the likely impact of
dense tra￿c, driver background and car characteristics. This
made it impossible to draw reliable conclusions about the
impact of these protection measures, or any invocation of
the risk homeostasis e￿ect.
7.4 Areas for Investigation
There are a number of information security behaviors that
could feasibly be impacted by a risk homeostasis adaptation.
We suggest a few:
(1) Clicking links: if people know that their email provider
has phish detection functionality, would they be more
likely to click on links in emails? Or if users know that
their web browser actively blocks known malware-
laden sites (with drive-by downloads), would they be
more likely to visit unknown sites, especially those
that may be associated with gambling, porn, or other
“gray area” activities?
(2) Password choice: would people choose weaker pass-
words for websites that they consider more secure (un-
der the assumption that these websites are less likely
to be hacked)?
(3) Data backup: if people have anti-virus software in-
stalled that has detected ransomware recently, would
they be less assiduous about making regular backups?
(4) Downloading ￿les: would people be more willing
to download ￿les if they have anti-malware software
installed?
(5) Smartphone protection: if someone’s smartphone
o￿ers the option of wiping or destroying the phone
remotely, would they be less likely to use a strong
PIN/password to prevent a thief from gaining access
to their phone’s functionality?
(6) App installation: would smartphone users who be-
lieve that their app provider tests apps before listing
them, be more likely to install downloaded apps?
(7) Website trust: would users who feel that third parties
(such as trust seal providers or regulators) monitor and
regulate eCommerce providers be more likely to buy
from unknown websites?
7.5 An Experimental Investigation
Zhang et al. [102] carried out an investigation into possible
risk homeostasis e￿ects in order to incorporate the presence
of a technical protection measure into the theory of planned
behavior.
They conducted a survey with 176 respondents. They ob-
served that the participants demonstrated a lower intention
to comply with security policies if there was a high percep-
tion of technical protection. The researchers state that this
“suggests possible risk compensation e￿ects in the information
security context.” They investigated the role of “perceived
behavioral control,” (PBC) which Ajzen [3] de￿nes as the
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individual’s expectation regarding the degree to which they
feel capable of performing the target behavior, combined
with the extent to which they perceive that they have the
necessary resources. Zhang et al.’s empirical results indi-
cated that PBC acts as a mediating variable between beliefs
regarding the protection provided by the mechanism and the
intention to engage in safe or risky behaviors. So, the direct
impact on behavioral intention may be the degree of con-
trol that the individual feels, rather than a risk homeostasis
activation.
Zhang et al.’s study appears to con￿rm the impact of a
sense of control, and once again demonstrates the di￿culty
of pinning down the real reasons behind behavioral inten-
tional modi￿cations.
8 QUO VADIS?
In summary, let us consider the premises of the RHT. It posits
that (1) people have an individual risk tolerance level, and
(2) that they assess the current situation and adjust their
behaviors in order to maintain this level.
These premises have been challenged in this review. In
the ￿rst place, it does not seem to be reasonable to assume
stability of a person’s individual risk tolerance level. There
is also good reason to question the human species’ ability
to judge risk correctly and objectively. Risk homeostasis
is completely unlike the well-known and widely-accepted
homeostasis e￿ects such as maintenance of a constant body
temperature. Risk is not a physiological e￿ect, and poorly
understood, as demonstrated by the discussion in this paper.
8.1 Identi￿ed Challenges
Even if we ignore the ￿awed nature of these two premises,
and proceed to attempt to test for the risk homeostasis e￿ect,
we face almost insuperable di￿culties in so doing.
Ethical Challenges. We have outlined the extensive chal-
lenges involved in proving that the risk homeostasis mecha-
nism exists in a way that is ethical and dependable.
The need to carry out our research ethically is particularly
constraining in this context. For example, in a carefully con-
trolled lab experiment, we could invite volunteers to bring
their own personal devices, both with and without malware
protection pre-installed. We could ask them to engage in
some potentially risky activity to see whether the protected
subjects exhibit more risky behaviors. However, a typical
ethics board (IRB in the US) would never permit this experi-
ment, nor any other where harm might result.
Risk homeostasis, in the safety arena, involves people
taking risks that could result in physical harm. Trying to
verify the e￿ect in the information security domain, in a
realistic way, would entail allowing people to take real risks
with their own information and resources. This would be
unethical.
Measurement Challenges. The core di￿culty is that risk
homeostasis experiments measure secondary e￿ects, basi-
cally because that is all we are able to do. If one observes an
e￿ect, one cannot know what unseen cognitive processes
have contributed towards it. Separating cause from e￿ect is
non-trivial in these kinds of experiments [38].
In Summary. It does not seem as if anyone, in safety or
security, has thus far been able to deliver compelling evidence
as to the validity of the risk homeostasis e￿ect.
We, too, are unable to propose any reliable experiments
that would be able to avoid all the di￿culties the literature
has uncovered in con￿rming the existence of the risk home-
ostasis e￿ect as it applies in the information security context.
In the following section we suggest some avenues for further
investigation in this area.
8.2 A Way Forward
A number of directions for future investigation can be
pursued:
• Talk to IRBs: TheMenlo Report on principles guiding
Information and Communications Technology (ICT)
research [75] explains that this principle does notmean
that no harm results, only that “risks to individual sub-
jects are weighed against the bene￿ts to society” (p. 9).
They explain that review boards ought to consider the
kinds of risks people would actually experience in day
to day ICT usage and be convinced that the experi-
ment is worth conducting. This means that if we want
to carry out risk homeostasis studies we should write
well-argued motivations for our studies, in terms of
bene￿ts to society as a whole. Assuming that such
studies would be turned down is perhaps overly naïve.
• Risk Perception Complexities and Risk Home-
ostasis: Our discussion in this paper, while acknowl-
edging the complexity of individual risk perception,
does not really explore the interaction of risk percep-
tion and risk homeostasis responses. In particular, the
issue of risk controllability in the information secu-
rity context would be a promising direction for future
investigation.
• Risk is Socially Informed: Risk perception’s social
nature, and its interaction with a risk homeostasis
response, is something that would be interesting to
explore in an information security context.
• Observational Studies: We plan to learn from the
studies carried out by Lévesque et al. [44]. We want
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to design an observational study to see whether we
can detect a risk homeostasis response to experimental
manipulations in the long term.
9 CONCLUSION & FUTUREWORK
This paper has presented a synopsis of the research into risk
homeostasis. We have elucidated the challenges of con￿rm-
ing or denying the e￿ect and presented some studies arguing
both for and against it. Our purpose was to propose some
experimental designs for testing for the existence and impact
of this e￿ect in the information security context. Having con-
ducted this review of the literature we have concluded that it
would be impossible to isolate the impact of risk homeostasis
in an experimental study that was both realistic and ethical.
We could wait until the research giants in this area have
concluded that RHT does indeed predict human behaviors.
If this happens, we can use these researchers’ proven tech-
niques to assess its in￿uence in the information security con-
text. It seems futile to carry out any risk homeostasis-related
experiments while the debate continues to rage, without
either side conclusively proving their point of view.
On the other hand, we have suggested a number of av-
enues for future investigation to advance the ￿eld and en-
hance our understanding of this fascinating ￿eld.
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